Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

Wrongful Death Of Sacramento Newborns Leads To Suit Against Doctors, Part 5 of 9

February 5, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during pre-trial litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in a medical malpractice case present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

As is evidenced by the attached declaration of Sandy Singer, UMH provided care and treatment to plaintiff Joan White, and plaintiff decedents (Owen and Tomas White), which met the standard of care. Ms. Singer has opined that the nurses the nurses properly observed and reported Ms. White’s condition and progress to her treating physician. The nurses appropriately monitored Ms.. White during her early labor, and followed the doctor’s orders regarding treatment. The nurses appropriately observed and reported on the condition and progress of the fetuses’s based on the fetal monitor. The nurses appropriately recorded their observations in Ms.. White’s chart and on the fetal monitoring strips.

The nurses followed the appropriate protocols for medication administration during early labor, as well as the protocols for early labor, and for the labor and delivery of extremely premature infants. In addition, Ms. Singer has opined that UMH did everything possible for the twins, but due to their extreme prematurity, nothing could be done to save their lives. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot establish that UMH breached its duty of care, and UMH’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.

A PARTY SUBMITTING UNCONTRADICTED EXPERT EVIDENCE MUST PREVAIL

California courts have held that where a defendant’s expert testimony is uncontradicted, no triable issue of fact remains for the jury to consider, and the defendant must prevail as a matter of law. (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406.) The Willard opinion describes the preemptive weight of expert testimony in a malpractice action as follows:

Sacramento Doctors Sued For Medical Negligence And Elder Abuse, Part 5 of 8

February 4, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this elder abuse/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Finally, in 2007, after searching diligently to find help to review the suspected claim, Ms. Steinford found her present counsel who agreed to review the matter, and upon reading the records helped retain a competent physician who expeditiously reviewed the records, an opinion was rendered of negligence such that current counsel could on May 2, 2007, for the first time properly issue notices pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 364.

Prior to the actions undertaken by current counsel Ms. Steinford did not have knowledge about the negligent causation ofher father’s death sufficient to bring an action sounding in medical negligence or elder abuse. Based upon these facts the statute of limitations for both medical negligence and elder abuse based upon medical negligence should be equitably tolled to allow this action to proceed or in the alternative the defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because of the false explanation of the course of death.

In addition to these facts alleged to show diligent pursuit of the factual basis to bring a claim, in this brief the plaintiffs also say:

This case is about the poisoning of Paul Steinford by means of multiple psycho tropic drugs that should never have been used but certainly should have been stopped when the symptoms started that lead to his death. Many of those symptoms are disclosed by the drug companies as side effects of the psycho tropic drugs. All of the treating doctors should have known that the drugs had those known side effects that included symptoms that Mr. Steinford exhibited to them including difficulty swallowing and toxicity.

Kaiser Sued By Sacramento Employee, Part 2 of 11

February 4, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this employment discrimination/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE SECTION 6310 (AND HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1278.5)

Kaiser has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims, including the major claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. For settlement purposes, it is important to recognize that Kaiser cannot win summary judgment or summary adjudication on this claim because of the existence of disputed issues of material fact, as well as Kaiser’s incorrect interpretation of the law.

The pretextual reason given for Ms. Church’s termination was her printing of a memorandum, addressed to her and publicly viewable on her supervisor’s computer screen, regarding discipline which her supervisor, Richard White, apparently intended to impose in retaliation for her frequent complaints about the incompetence of Kaiser management and Kaiser’s many continuing safety and OSHA violations. At Ms. Church’s termination “hearing,” Mr. White also falsely claimed that Ms. Church had accessed his Lotus Notes account and printed other documents from his work computer.

Ms. Church’s termination letter referred to the following reasons for her termination: Violation of the Principle of Responsibilities, breach of confidentiality, invasion of privacy and violation of KP computer assets. These should have been the reasons for Mr. White’s termination. Ms. Church printed the draft disciplinary memorandum and brought it to COO Stan Brown because of her concern that Richard White had left it visible on his screen in an open cubicle for everyone to see, thereby violating her privacy rights as an employee.

Bus Accident Leaves Sacramento Woman With Brain Injury, Part 2 of 11

February 4, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position after a jury verdict for plaintiff. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this bus accident/brain injury case and its proceedings.)

A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A JURY COULD CONCLUDE THAT PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT.

A directed verdict is appropriate only where there is no evidence to support a claim or defense.

A directed verdict is appropriate “only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving the evidence of the party against whom the motion is directed all the value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging every legitimate inference from such evidence in favor of that party, the court nonetheless determines there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support the claim or defense of the party opposing the motion.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 629-630; see also Quinn v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 472, 479-480.) In determining such a motion, the trial court has no power to weigh the evidence, and may not consider the credibility of witnesses. (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 629.)

A directed verdict may not be granted where there is any substantial evidence to support the claim or defense, “no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence.” (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, at pp. 630-631; see also Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1149-1150 [even slight evidence in support of a fact to be inferred may be sufficient to allow the issue to go to the jury].)

Sacramento Mother Sues For Medical Malpractice After Death Of Her Two Newborns, Part 4 of 9

February 3, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during pre-trial litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in a medical malpractice case present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BY EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE

Based on the allegations of the complaint, plaintiffs contend that the twins died because of the alleged professional negligence of the hospital. Generally speaking, actions for professional negligence center on an allegation that the professional breached the applicable standard of care. Proving what the applicable standard of care is, under most circumstances, requires testimony of a properly qualified expert. In Jambazian v. Borden, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 836, 844, the court stated:

The standard of skill, knowledge and care prevailing in a medical community is ordinarily a matter within the knowledge of experts. Whether the standard of care in the community has been breached presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by opinion testimony unless the medical question is within the common knowledge of lay persons.

In Evans v. Ohanesian (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 121, at 128, the court set forth the standards to be met when one offers the testimony of a medical expert:

To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the witness (1) has the required professional knowledge, learning, and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on that subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard required…under similar circumstances…

Sacramento Parents File Lawsuit For Twins’ Birth Injuries, Part 1 of 3

February 3, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

PLAINTIFFS’ TRAIL BRIEF

Plaintiffs William White and Joan White submit the following trial brief in the above entitled matter.

PARTIES
Plaintiffs: William White and Joan White
Defendants: Cindy Brown, M.D., and SAC Medical Group
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff, Joan White, began seeing Dr. Brown prior to or at the beginning of her pregnancy with her son, Ethan, who was born XX/XX/2003. During the pregnancy, Ms. White had an abnormal PAP smear. As a result of that abnormal PAP smear, on May 27, 2003, she underwent a colposcopy and a LEEP procedure, during which a portion of the cervix where the abnormal tissue is present is removed. This process can lead to an incompetent cervix and put Ms. White at high risk for pre-term labor.

In November of 2003, Ms. White discovered she was pregnant again, and started her prenatal care with Dr. Brown. In December of 2003, an ultrasound was performed and it was determined that Ms.. White was pregnant with twins. The ultrasound was performed in December by a radiologist at SanSkid Imaging Center. In February and March of 2004, Dr. Brown performed ultrasounds in her office; however, they were grossly inadequate and did not come close to complying with the guidelines set forth by the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Ms. White began experiencing dizziness and lack of energy for which Dr. Brown recommended increasing her iron intake. Ms. White asked Dr. Brown if she could go on disability, and Dr. Brown advised her that it was too early in the pregnancy. (See Part 2 of 3.)

Sacramento Woman Sues Kaiser For Wrongful Termination, Part 1 of 11

February 2, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this employment discrimination/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff’s Mandatory Settlement Conference Statement

Plaintiff Miranda Church, a Workplace Safety Specialist employed at Kaiser Foundation Hospital, was wrongfully terminated on January 10, 2006, in violation of public policy and Kaiser’s own employment policies. Prior to her termination, Ms. Church was treated in an abusive and discriminatory manner by her quasi-manager, David Black, and was underpaid compared to her male counterpart at another hospital within Kaiser’s Sacramento group. At the time of her termination, Kaiser failed to return personal property to her and, despite further requests, continued to keep her personal property. To compound its injuries to Ms. Church, her former supervisor has made false statements which wrongfully prevented Ms. Church from obtaining subsequent employment.

It is plaintiff’s position that, for statutory and regulatory reasons, Kaiser is obligated to follow its policies in terminating individuals who have otherwise made complaints about Kaiser’s misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance. In Ms. Church’s case, Kaiser failed to properly follow its own policies…miserably. Not only did Kaiser terminate the wrong person involved in the incident described below, but, in terminating Ms. Church, Kaiser failed to:

1) Provide any rule, guideline or policy which would indicate that the act was an offense subject to discipline or termination.

2) Provide any oral warning prior to termination.

Sacramento Woman Injured In Bus Accident, Part 1 of 11

February 2, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position after a jury verdict for plaintiff. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this bus accident/brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Defendant, Universal Bus, LLC respectfully submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion for a new trial:

INTRODUCTION

Defendant moves pursuant to CCP § 657 et seq, for a new trial on the claims made by plaintiff Jane Wong, a Sacramento resident. A new trial is warranted because:

1. The jury was not allowed to consider the comparative fault of the plaintiff despite evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that plaintiff failed to exercise due care for her safety; and
2. Plaintiff’s counsel’s prejudicial and improper “golden rule” argument encouraged the jury to award excessive pain and suffering damages; and

3. The jury’s award of damages was excessive.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD AUTHORITY TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.

On a motion for new trial, the court reviews the entire case and, if it concludes that a miscarriage of justice occurred on any of the grounds delineated in Code of Civil Procedure § 657, it must grant a new trial. (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 111.)

Two Infants Die At Sacramento Hospital Due To Malpractice, Part 3 of 9

February 1, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during pre-trial litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in a medical malpractice case present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

ARGUMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE GRANTED WHEN MOVING PARTY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ACTION IS WITHOUT MERIT

A defendant may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it contends the cause of action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The cause of action has no merit if:

1. One or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or

2. A defendant establishes an affirmative defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n).)

The motion shall be granted if all of the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Any alleged disputes must concern material facts.

… [O]nce a party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party may not defeat summary judgment by attempting to generate a factual dispute as to immaterial issues … (Romero v. American President Lines, Ltd. (1995 38 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1203.)

Workplace Harassment Suit Filed By Female Sacramento Employee, Part 5 of 6

February 1, 2010 | by Moseley Collins

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

DEFENDANT’S DEPOSITION MUST BE COMPELLED BECAUSE WITHOUT A COURT INTERVENTION DEFENDANT WILL CONTINUE TO DELAY HIS APPEARING FOR DEPOSITION.

Defendant is clearly attempting to postpone the inevitable. Upon the filing of the instant action and the service of a deposition notice, Defendant suddenly became unavailable. When Ms. Brown’s counsel offered to fly to New York so that Defendant’s alleged extended business trip would not be disrupted, Defendant refused. Ms. Brown has begged and pleaded for dates upon which Defendant would be back in Los Angeles and available for his deposition. Ms. Brown has received none.

Rather, Defendant has maintained that he will be available in August. When in August? Ms. Brown has no idea because Defendant refuses to commit to a date at this time. Presumably, Defendant expects Ms. Brown to wait until August and then, upon his return to Los Angeles, attorneys for both sides can schedule a deposition. According to Defendant, such behavior is permissible because no trial date has been set in this sexual harassment matter.