Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

Botched Delivery Results In Birth Injury For Sacramento Family, Part 3 of 12

August 5, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury case and its proceedings.)

Sean’s father, William Taylor, was present in the delivery room and photographed the delivery. His deposition testimony, and his photographs, provide direct evidence that is in direct conflict with the events described by Dr. X. in her delivery notes.

Q. Okay. Did he come out straight, his head, or was he sideways?

A. He came out straight. After she cut and told her to push, then his head came out just like I’m looking up straight up at the ceiling. It came out like that and stopped.

Q. Then what happened after his head came out?

A. She grabbed him by the forehead and put her hands around the neck part.

Q. Then what happened after his head came out?

A. She grabbed him by the forehead and put her hands around the neck part.

Q. You said grabbed him on the forehead?

A. Put her thumb on the forehead, you know, like you grab a football. You would grab a head like this, like — I know you can’t put like this on here (indicating). She grabbed his head and had her thumb on the forehead and had her hand around his neck, and then she turned him.

Q. So one hand, then was on his head; and the other hand was on his neck?

A. Right.

Q. Which hand was on his head?

A. I can’t recall. I think it was the right hand. I think. I’m giving you an estimate.

Q. I don’t want you to guess.

A. Well, I can’t tell you for sure which hand was on his forehead.

Q. You do know that one hand was on his head and one hand was on his neck, correct?

A. That’s right. That’s correct.

Sacramento Family Sues For Medical Negligence, Part 1 of 4

August 4, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical negligence case and its proceedings.)

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in a personal injury case present such issues to the court.

Reply of Defendant Universal Hospital to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
INTRODUCTION.

This action is premised on care rendered to plaintiff Cindy Jones. Cindy Jones contends that Cedars-Sinai and the other defendants provided negligent care to her regarding a bump on her left hand. Cindy Jones alleges that she was negligently notified that she did not test positive for a highly contagious strain of staphylococcus (MRSA), causing her to fail to take precautionary measures and to unknowingly expose her family, including her daughter, the minor plaintiff, Tammy Jones, to the MRSA, resulting in the daughter’s hospitalization. The first cause of action is asserted by Cindy Jones relating to the care she received at Universal Hospital in Sacramento, under Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436, to strike from paragraph 12 of the first cause of action, page 3:27 to page 4:2, of the complaint:

Therein Plaintiff unknowingly exposed her family, including Co-Plaintiff Tammy Jones, and the general public to the highly contagious strain of MRSA, resulting in the infection and hospitalization of Tammy Jones.

These allegations have nothing to do with the claim by plaintiff Cindy Jones for negligence. Cindy Jones is seeking to recover damages for the loss of her daughter’s consortium. Recovery of such damages is precluded by Baxter v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 461. If plaintiff Cindy Jones is trying to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander witness of the injuries allegedly suffered by her daughter, she has not alleged any facts showing that she had a contemporaneous awareness of any injury at the time it was occurring as required under Thing v. LaChusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 667-668 and Bird v. Saenz (2002) 28 Cal.4th 910, 920-921.

Roseville Nursing Home Sued For Brain Injury By Patient, Part 1 of 6

August 3, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Universal Homes Motion for Summary Judgment
THE PARTIES

This is a wrongful death action arising out of the death of plaintiff’s beloved mother, Felicity Smith at XYZ Hospital on May 6, 2005. The decedent resided at the Universal Home in Roseville, California owned by defendant UNIVERSAL NURSING HOMES (hereinafter Universal Home ). Due to the negligence of Universal Home, Ms. Smith fell and was injured. Seeking treatment for injuries sustained in the fall, Ms. Smith was taken to XYZ Hospital, owned and operated by defendant XYZ TOWNSHIP HEALTHCARE DISTRICT (hereinafter XYZ Hospital ). Near the end of her hospital stay, Ms. Smith got out of her hospital bed to go to the bathroom. She had not been diapered, and urinated on the floor. She slipped and fell in her own urine striking her head. Ms. Smith died from this head and brain injury.

Plaintiff alleges that the negligence of Universal Home in causing the injury for which Ms. Smith was hospitalized in the first place was a cause of her death.

Sacramento Plaintiff Must Prove Causation In Medical Malpractice Action, Part 4 of 4

August 3, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

The following four blog entries follow-up the previous two entries from July. These entries address the same issues, but do so from the defense side. By comparing the entries readers should get a good perspective as to how the parties present such issues to the court.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION #1 MUST BE USED BECAUSE THERE IS NO CACI INSTRUCTION THAT INFORMS THE JURY OF THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN IN ESTABLISHING CAUSATION

The other CACI instructions (CACI 400, as modified by CACI 500, and CACI 200) instruct the jury that the plaintiff must establish causation, but they do not instruct the jury as to what satisfies causation here. Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that establishing the burden of proof for the overarching action is equivalent to explaining the standard for causation.

Further, plaintiffs’ assertion that the phrase reasonable medical probability would be unduly confusing to the jury is without merit. Medical probability is not legalese; it is simply using the additional word medical to demonstrate that the probability must be judged by a medical professional rather than a layman. Any jury instruction contrary to Special Instruction #1 would provide the jury with a clear understanding of an incorrect burden of proof.

Sacramento Police Officer Responsible For Brain Injury To Local Man, Part 2 of 9

August 3, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF FACTS cont.

Defendants’ own police procedures expert has testified that it was improper for Officer Doe to fail to notify dispatch of what he had upon arrival. Officer Doe himself has testified that he was out of his car, in the presence of five unknown males, for about five seconds when one of the men (plaintiff James Santoro) turned and began to lope away. Officer Doe testified that within one second he started to chase Santoro without knowing who the aggressors were and knowing very little about any of the five involved. The crime Officer Doe was investigating was a simple misdemeanor P.C. § 415 (fighting in public).

Officer Doe ran right past the four other men, including the two who instigated the fight. In doing so, he violated proper police protocols and clear training guidelines.

Officer Doe ran about 100 feet toward Mr. Santoro. Witnesses will testify that Officer Doe yelled stop once or twice, and nothing else. Officer Doe claims he yelled numerous times. James Santoro, complying with Officer Doe’ requests, stops and turns around. As he does so, Officer Doe hits Mr. Santoro in the chest with both hands, with great force. Mr. Santoro flies backward.

Officer Doe hit Mr. Santoro with such force that Mr. Santoro’ body flew into the air. According to Officer Doe and an independent eye witness who was six feet away, Mr. Santoro’ legs flew up in front of his body, which was now parallel to the ground, flying backward. Mr. Santoro was unable to break his fall in any way. His back hit the sidewalk and his head snapped back onto the pavement with great force, causing a loud smack which, according to the eye witness, sounded like a melon smashing onto the pavement. Mr. Santoro’ head bounced up and smacked onto the pavement a second time due to the force with which he was hit.

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Obstetrician Responsible For Birth Injury At Sacramento Hospital, Part 2 of 12

August 3, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury case and its proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is medical negligence action arises out of serious nerve injury suffered by Sean Taylor during birth on 6/4/1998. Sean’s mother, Edith Taylor, was under the care of obstetrician Dr. Vanessa X. when she was admitted to Sacramento’s Universal Medical Center at 1:15 p.m. on June 3, 1998. Edith Taylor was then in early labor, at almost 41 weeks, based upon an estimated date of confinement of 5/29/98.

Dr. X. ordered induction of labor by Pitocin drip and artificial rupture of Edith’s membrane, which reportedly resulted in the release of clear amniotic fluid. Epidural anesthesia was begun, and labor continued throughout the balance of that day and into the early morning hours of June 4. During that time, the patient was started on antibiotics for a temperature of 101.

At 3:40 a.m. on June 4, Pitocin was discontinued, and at 4:00 a.m. a vaginal examination revealed that the patient was 9 cm dilated and at 1 station. I.V. antibiotics were continued and the mother was instructed to continue pushing to assist in delivery, which occurred at 5:10 a.m.

The Popras 6 form for Delivery Data and Problems lists shoulder dystocia as a birth complication. The one minute Apgar scores were zero score for respirations, muscle tone and color, requiring emergency resuscitation. Erb’s Palsy was noted at birth

Tobacco Company Sued By Sacramento-Area Woman, Part 7 of 7

August 2, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

Relatedly, the courts have recognized that the potential for jury confusion and prejudice is particularly acute in cases like this one, where the plaintiff proposes to spend far more time talking about conduct that affected other parties than the conduct that affected the plaintiff. The risk of prejudice from other acts evidence increases tremendously when the plaintiff is permitted to make that evidence the centerpiece of her punitive damages presentation. Holdgrafer, 160 Cal. App. 4th at 934. The Second District, for example, noted that [t]he vast majority of the evidence presented in the punitive damages phase, and counsel’s arguments to the jury, related to evidence of conduct that did not harm the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs’ counsel began his closing argument by recounting the evidence in great detail, the court noted, and it dominated the rest of his presentation. Id. For that reason, the court concluded, the improper admission of other-acts evidence was particularly prejudicial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 420, 423 (noting that [f]rom their opening statements onward the Campbells framed this case as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its nationwide activities, but identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them ); Durham, 360 S.C. at 653 ( Further, the evidence is inflammatory, especially in light of the fact that the [other acts] evidence was the only evidence admitted during the punitive damages phase. ).

Automobile Accident Forces Sacramento Victim To Battle Defense Medical Experts, Part 5 of 5

August 2, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in a personal injury case present such issues to the court.

LEGAL ISSUES cont.

The defendant, if he was negligent, is solely responsible for the initial injury; liability for the defendant’s enhanced or aggravated injury is properly apportioned between the plaintiff the defendant and subsequent healthcare providers in accordance with the rules of comparative fault and Civil Code § 1431.2.

A second legal issue is evidence of the financial interest of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses, including their fee arrangements with plaintiff’s counsel. The defendant will provide evidence of financial ties between plaintiff’s physicians and attorney to demonstrate an ongoing business relationship between plaintiff’s physicians and attorney.

A witness may be examined on the issue of possible bias, which includes a financial interest in the case. (See: People v. Mickle (1991)54 Cal.3d 140, 168; People v. Munoz(1984) 157 Cal.App. 3d 999, 1010.) Evidence Code § 780(f) allows for the interrogation or questioning of a witness to determine the credibility of a witness, including the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest or motive. Whether a treating doctor has a lien in the matter is indicative not only of his pecuniary interest in the case but goes to the issue of credibility and bias and the jury is entitled to know of such financial interest. If the plaintiff loses, the doctor does not get paid.

Sacramento Man Suffers Brain Injury At Hands Of Police, Part 1 of 9

August 1, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Liability from Damages

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF FACTS

The plaintiff, James Santoro, is a 28 year old life long resident of Sacramento and law abiding member of the community. Before this incident he had never been arrested or had any negative contact with law enforcement. His family has been in Sacramento for three generations. His father and mother were both born in Sacramento and come from families that have always been hard working, law abiding members of the Sacramento community.

At the time of the incident Mr. Santoro was working as a file clerk for a large law firm in downtown Sacramento. Mr. Santoro had been working there for approximately two years and was an exemplary employee, well liked and well respected by all members of the firm. Prior to working for his current firm worked as a file clerk for another well-respected large law firm in Sacramento.

Sacramento police officer John Doe joined the police department in 2002 and completed his POST training and his field training with SPD in 2003. His training included training in patrol techniques, crimes in progress and foot pursuits.

January 4, 2006 was the night of the national championship football game at the Rose Bowl between U.S.C. and Texas. Many people were in the East Sac. area of downtown Sacramento to watch the game at one of the many restaurants and bars in the area.

Sacramento Family Sues For Birth Injury, Part 1 of 12

August 1, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment of Universal Medical Center and Vanessa X., M.D.

INTRODUCTION

Universal’s statute of limitations argument has been clearly and conclusively rejected by the Supreme Court of this state, as well as all relevant decisions of the intermediate courts. An infant’s claim for medical malpractice resulting in birth injuries is governed by C.C.P. §340.5, not §340.4 and may be filed at any time prior to the child’s eighth birthday.

Universal’s contention that there is no evidence supporting its liability under the Elam rule requiring a hospital to assure the competence of physicians and surgeons with staff privileges is unsupported by even the hint of evidence, and the failure to negate such liability means that the
Court is required to deny the motion as to substantive grounds of no liability. The claim that there was no neglect in the provision of medical care is flatly contradicted by percipient and photographic evidence, and the assertion that there was no causal connection between that care and the minor’s injuries is frivolous. This Court so held in denying the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Vanessa X., M.D. on May 15, 2007. This child suffered exactly the injuries that would be expected from the dangerous and improper extraction of the baby in the McRoberts position by twisting his head to extract him from the birth canal.