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It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this birth injury case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During the course of the trial, the evidence of Dr. Hill’s negligence was based upon her failure to appropriately confirm the differential diagnosis of dopa responsive dystonia by offering the patient a trial of Sinemet (L-dopa). The evidence was undisputed that the diagnosis is made in one of two ways: a trial of L-dopa, or a lumbar puncture with special assay. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

None of the experts testified to an alternative method of diagnosis or treatment under the circumstances at bar. Neither Dr. Hill nor any of the other expert witnesses suggested that she recommend a lumbar puncture. Plaintiff therefore objected to Jury Instruction 506, entitled Alternative Method of Care when offered by the defendant, since same would in effect remove the issue of standard of care from this jury. Initially the court agreed that the instruction may not be warranted. But after argument of counsel, the court, over objection, gave the requested instruction. The instruction states as follows:

A pediatric neurologist is not necessarily negligent just because she chooses one medically accepted method of treatment or diagnosis and it turns out that another medically accepted method would have been a better choice. (CACI 506)

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff Peter Hall’s Notice of Motion and Motion for New Trial; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof

On June XX, 2010 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Sacramento Superior Court, Plaintiff Peter Hall will move this Court for an order for a new trial of this matter.

Plaintiff’s Motion is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the evidence and case law, the pleadings, documents, records, and files in this action, and such oral and documentary evidence and argument which may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION

On or about February XX, 2008, Plaintiff Peter Hall, age 25, was driving his 2001 Range Rover eastbound on West Blvd. in Sacramento, California. Suddenly, defendant Genvieve White made an unsafe left turn in her 2004 BMW X5 SUV from westbound West towards University Dr., crossing three lanes of traffic, directly in front of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was unable to avoid defendant’s vehicle, resulting in a severe collision between the vehicles.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

On or about March XX, 2010, trial of this matter commenced in Department “X” of the Sacramento Superior Court. During the trial plaintiff presented substantial evidence and expert opinions supporting his position that he had sustained general and special damages totaling in excess of $129,000.00.

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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this medical malpractice case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

Under well established discovery rules, when it appears reasonably certain that the consultant-expert will give his or her professional opinion as a witness on a material matter in dispute, the attorney’s work product privilege terminates and the expert’s knowledge and opinions are subject to discovery and disclosure. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654-655) In other words:

Once it appears reasonably certain that the consultant-expert is to become a witness in the action, the attorney’s work-product privilege terminates and the expert’s knowledge and opinions are subject to discovery and disclosure. (Swartzman v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 195, 202, citing, San Diego Professional Assn. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194.) For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Thus, in this case, since plaintiff’s expert has been designated, the work product privilege can no longer be claimed. That privilege has effectively been terminated. This rule of termination is one of fairness.

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It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this medical malpractice case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

The purpose of Civil Code § 3333.1(a) has generally been viewed as an attempt to eliminate the so-called double recovery obtained by plaintiffs who have their medical expenses paid by their own health insurance and still obtain damages for such expenses from defendant tortfeasors. Barme v. Wood (1984) 37 Cal.3d 174, fn.5. Subsection (a) overrides the collateral source rule to a considerable extent in medical malpractice cases, allowing a health care provider to introduce evidence of benefits payable to the plaintiff from the following collateral sources: private health, sickness, accident, or disability insurance, state disability insurance (SDI), workers’ compensation, Social Security survivor’s insurance, Social Security disability insurance (SSDI), or the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.

When a defendant chooses to introduce such collateral source evidence under Section 3333.1(a), the plaintiff may introduce evidence of the amounts she has paid, in insurance premiums for example, to secure those collateral source benefits. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The collateral source provision is one of the provisions of MICRA, which was intended to reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance.

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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this medical malpractice case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

Although, out of context, the terms full-body physical therapy and the absence of special precautions do exist in the cited passage, it is clear from the outset that Dr. Lee did not want any therapy done on the neck. As he said, above Very important now. I say again, therapy is not for neck. The contrary claim by Plaintiffs is simply an attempt to falsely re-characterize very clear testimony. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

It should also be noted that Plaintiffs’ only standard of care expert, Dr. Goldstein, testified specifically as to the nature of physical therapy that he would criticize at one point in his trial testimony, and that was as follows (Reporter’s transcript, page 160, line 28 to page 161, line 5):

Q. [by Mr. Howard] All right. And did you find that Dr. Lee had done any of these things?

A. No. And actually ordering physical therapy probably wasn’t a good idea. Generally speaking, if someone has a possibility of a broken neck, I would not order physical therapy of the neck.

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It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this birth injury case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

MRS. SMITH’S ACTS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON MITIGATION.

Although the law does require a plaintiff in a personal injury action to use reasonable effort to care for their injuries or avoid further harm, such a duty to mitigate cannot and should not be inferred as an obligation of Emma through her mother’s decision to seek additional opinions. An extensive amount of research has been done to determine if there is a California case addressing imputation of a duty to mitigate to a child. Counsel has been unable to locate such California authority. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

But the issue was decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court in the case of Lange v. Hoyt (1932) 114 Conn. 590. In that case, an eight-year-old child was struck by a bus. The mother refused hospitalization and surgeries for the child, and the minor’s injuries were therefore aggravated. Holding that the mother’s failure to mitigate was not a superseding or intervening act, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated as follows:

A child of the age of eight years is necessarily dependent upon her parents as regards the steps to be taken to bring about a recovery from an injury, and, if she is not herself guilty of any negligence or improper conduct, the failure of the parents to take proper steps to that end, by a parity of reasoning, cannot be such a cause of any portion of the injuries as will defeat a recovery for all the results of the defendant’s wrongdoing. (Lange v. Hoyt, supra, 114 Conn. 590.)

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

This Court May Exclude Evidence That Will Waste Time And Confuse Jurors

Evidence Code §352 states that the court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially out weighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Emphasis added.) See People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 514; Cubic Corp. v. Marty (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 438, 455.

Any testimony regarding the automobile collision involving plaintiff that occurred in 1998 will likely involve an undue consumption of time. There is no record that plaintiff was in an accident in 1998 and no record of any injury sustained as a result of the alleged accident. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The only record of a 1998 accident involving plaintiff is his statement to William Hill, P.A., one of the many individuals who have treated plaintiff since the crash with defendant. Thus, plaintiff anticipates that defendant will attempt to introduce the testimony of William Hill that plaintiff told Hill plaintiff was in a 1998 car accident. This testimony will add nothing new to the evidence presented because it has no bearing on liability, causation, or damages. Allowing testimony regarding this event will prolong the trial without good reason or justification.

Further, any mention of this collateral matter will create a substantial danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. Should this evidence be admitted, the jury will likely speculate that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a 10-year-old accident.

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It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this birth injury case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiffs Emma and Sabrina Smith’s Points and Authorities in Support Motion for New Trial
INTRODUCTION

As the Court is well aware, this is a medical malpractice case involving Dr. Hill’s diagnosis and care of Emma Smith. The defendant in this litigation was the Universal Hospital Medical Center through their physician, Anne Hill. The case was tried before a jury of twelve and a verdict was returned on April 28, 2008. The verdict was 9 to 3 on negligence in favor of defendant, after the jury inquired about CACI 506. Judgment was entered on May 24,2008, and was served upon Plaintiff on May 31, 2010. On June 15, 2010, Plaintiff timely filed her Notice of Intention to Move for New Trial and her Points and Authorities in Support of New Trial.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Plaintiff contends that she was prevented from having a fair trial because of irregularities in the proceeding and errors of law, and that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. Specifically, the evidence did not support the giving of CACI 506, and once given, it was error not to give CACI 533 (modified), Plaintiff’s requested special jury instructions on the theory of informed consent.

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The following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during the pre-trial stage of civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION

Summary of Facts:

In this case, Plaintiff Wayne Smith is seeking personal injury damages for head injuries he suffered on December 14, 2006, when a 10″ Crescent wrench fell approximately 12 to 15 feet from scaffolding above and struck him on the head while he was attending a Christmas play produced by the co-defendants at their Sacramento church. Medical evidence shows that plaintiff has a traumatic brain injury. However, defendants dispute that plaintiffs brain injury was caused by the wrench striking him on the head and claim that all or a substantial portion of plaintiffs brain injury was pre-existing. Thus, the central issue of this case is the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries caused by the incident. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Subject of Defense Medical Expert Opinions:

The parties exchanged their designations of experts pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2034.210 et seq. (All subsequent references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.) The defendants jointly designated as medical experts Mike Hall, M.D. and Rupert Jones, M.D.. As to each of these defense experts, Section 2034.260(c) requires a declaration of counsel that contains: (1) a brief narrative statement of the qualifications of each expert ; and (2) A brief narrative statement of the general substance of the testimony the expert is expected to give.

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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this medical malpractice case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

Defendant Medical Center Foundation Hospitals, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine
GENERAL OBJECTIONS

Defendants object to the format of Plaintiffs motions to the extent that they fail to comply with any relevant requirements indicated in the Evidence Code, Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Court.

The Work Product Privilege Terminates And The Expert’s Knowledge And Opinions Are Subject To Discovery and Disclosure Upon Expert Designation For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

It has long been recognized that the work of an expert-consultant is protected by the attorney’s work product privilege. (Williamson v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 829, 834; Mack v. Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 11) It is obvious why an expert’s work production is shielded under the broad scope of the attorney’s work-product privilege. The expert is employed by counsel to form an opinion which he may later present as a witness in court. He is also engaged as an adviser on trial preparation and tactics for the case and in this latter capacity serves as a professional consultant to counsel on the technical and forensic aspects of his specialty.

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