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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Defendants’ Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence of Defendant Tamara Black’s Prior Sexual History
INTRODUCTION

Defendants XYZ Security, Ken Brown, Tim Lee, Sondra Green, and Tamara Black (collectively “Defendants”) respectfully move this Court, in limine, to preclude Plaintiff, Bobby White (“Plaintiff”), his counsel, and witnesses from commenting upon, inquiring into, and introducing evidence at trial relating to Ms. Black’s alleged past sexual conduct with anyone other than Plaintiff, and prior complaints of sexual harassment Ms. Black made unrelated to Plaintiff. This motion is made on the grounds that evidence of past sexual conduct with individuals other than Plaintiff is not relevant to the issues in this case. Whether Plaintiff was terminated because of his race and gender does not turn on the private sexual behavior of Ms. Black. The admission of such evidence, introduced by Plaintiff in an effort to bolster his claims, also is prohibited as a matter of law.

This motion is based on the California Evidence Code sections 350, 1106, and 352 the California Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.220, the memorandum of points and authorities set forth below, the papers and records filed herein, and such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of this motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff has sued his former employer, XYZ Security and various of his co-workers, following his termination in October 2005 for violation of XYZ’s harassment and discrimination policy.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this birth injury/medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED HIS EXPERT DECLARATION WHICH DISPUTES THE DEFENDANT’S EXPERT’S CONCLUSIONS – AND THIS DISPUTE REQUIRES DENIAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff’s obstetric and gynecology, John Zee, M.D. has properly presented his opinion in his declaration testimony. Plaintiff’s expert declaration, which disputes the declaration of the Defendant’s expert declaration, requires denial of this motion for summary judgement. Dr. Zee meets all the requirements of expert testimony – including the standard of care as it relates to nurses and physicians:

To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the witness (1) has the required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard required of a physician under similar circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility. (Emphasis added.) (Evans v. Ohanesian (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 121, 128.)

Consequently, Defendant is not in a position to argue the “weight” of Dr. Zee’s testimony; that is the domain of the trier of fact, in this case, the jury. The Plaintiffs have properly presented their expert testimony on standard of care and causation. Defendants’ experts’ declarations are now controverted by the Plaintiffs’ expert who concludes the Defendants’ actions were below the standard of care and also significant contributing factors in the cause of the child’s condition:

And counter affidavits disclosing evidence or inferences reasonably deducible from such evidence of a triable issue of fact require denial of the motion.
(Emphasis added.) (Sesma v. Cueto, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 113.)

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this workplace discrimination/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It has long been the rule that in ruling upon a motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the trial court is encouraged to sit as a thirteenth juror and reconsider and re-weigh the evidence. (See, e.g., Fountain Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 743, 750-52.) In Norden v. Hartman, for example, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a motion for new trial based on insufficient evidence stating as follows:

This court has on many occasions, in similar workplace discrimination cases, commended the trial courts in granting new trials when, in the opinion of the court, sitting as a thirteenth juror, the weight of the evidence appears to be contrary to the jury’s determination …. This practice should not be discouraged. [Citations.]. On appeal all presumptions are in favor of the order and against the verdict. (Norden v. Hartman, supra, 111 Cal.App. 2d at 758.) In fact, the California Supreme Court long ago made clear that trial courts should not be reluctant to grant new trials for insufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court’s guidance is worthy of citation at length:

“We frequently have cause to believe that the judges of the superior court are too reluctant to exercise their power of granting a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence, and too much inclined to acquiesce in a verdict of the jury which does not meet with their own approval…. The trial court cannot rest upon a conflict in the evidence, but must weigh and consider the evidence for both parties, and determine for itself the just conclusion to be drawn from it. Where the decision is against the weight of the evidence it is the duty of that court to grant a new trial. [Citations omitted.] If the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, and is convinced that it is clearly against the weight of the evidence, it is his duty to set it aside, even though there may have been some conflict in the testimony. He has had the same opportunity as the jury to observe the manner of the witnesses, and to decide upon their credibility, and it is his duty to see that the verdict is not clearly against the weight of the evidence.”

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this elder abuse/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Here, Allen may bring a civil action under section 15656 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. In Laczko v. Jules Meyers, Inc. (1969) 276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 295, 80 Cal. Rptr. 798, and Michael R. v. Jeffrey B. (1984) 158 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 205 Cal. Rptr. 312, the court held that a violation of a statute embodying a public policy is actionable even though no specific civil remedy is provided in the statute itself. Any injured member of the class whom the statute was designed to protect may include the violation of the statute as a cause of action in a civil matter.

There is nothing in Welfare and Institutions Code 15656 that precludes Allen from bringing a civil action based upon that state. The general purpose of the EADACPA is to protect elders and dependent adults from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial neglect. Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 23,33, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610. Allen is a member of the class that section 15656 was designed to protect. As a member of this class, Allen may bring a civil action balked upon section 15656, even though the statute does not provide for civil remedies. The legislature did not intend to prevent an individual from asserting a cause of action in a civil matter under Welfare and Institutions Code §15656.

Allen has alleged a viable claim under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §15656.

As stated above, less particularity in pleading statutory causes of action is needed when the defendant may be assumed to have knowledge of the facts equal to or superior to that possessed by the plaintiff. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co. (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 463, 474, 20 Cal. Rptr. 69; Dahlquist v. State of California (1966) 243 Cal. App. 2d 208, 212, 52 Cal. Rptr. 324.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this automobile accident/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

COURTS DISCUSSING LIEN RIGHTS HAVE IMPROPERLY ERODED THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

While it appears uniform that under the collateral source rule a tortfeasor is not entitled to introduce evidence that the injured plaintiff has insurance for purposes of proving that the plaintiff has not been injured to the extent an insurer has already paid for those injuries, some appellate courts have either directly or indirectly ruled that the tortfeasor is able to introduce evidence of the amount the plaintiff’s insurer has paid in order to cap the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery. These courts have reasoned that if the insurer has a separate agreement with the health care provider to furnish medical care at a rate below what is normally charged, then that reduced rate becomes the plaintiff’s true damages for purposes of fixing his or her recovery.

The first reported case to take this path was Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1635. There, in the context of an action where the injured plaintiff’s medical care was paid for by Medi-Cal, the court initially explained:

Preliminarily, we note there is no question here that Medi-Cal’s payment for all injury-related medical care and services does not preclude plaintiff’s recovery from defendant, as special damages, of the amount paid. This follows from the collateral source rule.

Id. at 640.

However, without any further reference to the collateral source doctrine, the court proceeded to reason:

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this workplace discrimination/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN THIS WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION CASE
Court’s Obligation to Re-Weigh Evidence

On application of the party aggrieved, a verdict may be vacated, in whole or in part, and a new trial may be granted, on all or some of the issues, on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict if substantial rights of the aggrieved party are materially affected thereby. (Code Civ. Proc. § 657(6).) The ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict must be established by the minutes of the court (see Code Civ. Proc. § 658).

A motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence is properly granted if, after weighing the evidence and reasonable inferences, the court is convinced that the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision. (Code Civ. Proc. § 657; Russell v. Nelson (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d 919, 922.) The court does not disregard the verdict, or decide what result it should have reached if the case had been tried without a jury, but instead it should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633.)

While it is the exclusive province of the jury to find the facts, it is the duty of the trial court to see that this function is intelligently and justly performed, and in the exercise of its supervisory power over the verdict, the court should consider the probative force of the evidence and satisfy itself that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict. (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633.) The trial judge is required to weigh the evidence and in so doing he or she may disbelieve witnesses and draw inferences contrary to those supporting the verdict. (See Locksley v. Ungureanu (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 457, 463; Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 104, 112; Dietrich v. Litton Industries, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal. App. 3d 704, 707, 717.)

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this elder abuse/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Here, Allen alleges that defendants were responsible for his custodial care due to his physical and mental disabilities. He further alleges that defendants abused this position when defendant and its employees [E]ither caused, contributed to, or witnessed the injuries sustained by plaintiff and deliberately and callously failed and refused to seek or provide appropriate medical attention for those injuries, all with the intention to delay or prevent discovery of their own involvement and responsibility in the injury causing event and its aftermath.

Allen also avers that the defendant’s acts were unreasonable and were done for the “[P]urpose of causing plaintiff to suffer pain, mental anguish, and severe emotional and mental distress.” Allen was also in a depressed state of mind due to the fact that he was a victim of a shooting that rendered him paralyzed, and defendants were aware of this fact that made him susceptible to further mental distress. These allegations, along with Allen’s factual allegations of abuse and neglect, are sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, defendant’s demurrer should be overruled with respect to this cause of action.

THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE WITH RESPECT TO ALLEN’S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFENDANT’S VIOLATION OF CAL. WELF & INST. CODE §15656
Allen may properly assert a claim under Welf. & Inst. Code §15656.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this automobile accident/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

California’s Legislature has recognized the collateral source rule by carving very limited exceptions to that rule which are meaningful only if the rule itself exists. For example, Government Code § 985 sets forth a detailed procedure for when a public entity provides collateral services to an injured plaintiff. That section is applicable only where the public entity is a defendant. It allows the court, post-verdict, to consider giving the public entity credit for the collateral source payments, after taking evidence concerning the nature of the benefits and plaintiff’s reimbursements obligations.

The statute makes clear that “[a]ny collateral source payment paid or owed to or on behalf of a plaintiff’shall be inadmissible in any action for personal injuries or wrongful death where a public entity is a defendant.” The public entity can seek recovery of collateral benefits following a verdict which includes “damages for which payment from a collateral source listed below has already been paid or is obligated to be paid for services or benefits that were provided prior to the commencement of trial…” Id.

Likewise, the Legislature also created a statutory exception to the rule for medical malpractice defendants when it enacted it as an aspect of MICRA (Civil Code § 3333.1, et. seq.). As with the public entity exception, the Legislature crafted a compromise procedure for the evidentiary handling of the exception, and accompanied the change with fundamental changes in the structure of attorney’s fees and general damages in medical malpractice cases. Specifically, the MICRA statutes provide the plaintiff an opportunity to introduce a host of relevant and admissible evidence as to the reasonable value of the medical services provided, including not simply the billed charges, but also evidence of the premiums paid to secure health insurance benefits and other evidence of the reasonable value of those services.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this elder abuse/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Allen has properly alleged wrongful misconduct on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of defendant.

The Cal. Welf. and Instit. Code §15657.5(b)(2) provides that a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Cal. Civ. Code §3294(b) before any damages or attorney fees allowed under the EADACPA may be imposed against the employer.

Under section 3294(b) of the Civil Code, an employer may be deemed liable for punitive damages based upon the acts of an employee if:

(1) The employer had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him/her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others;
(2) The employer authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded; or

(3) The employer was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.

For pleading purposes, an general allegation of agency is sufficient in overcoming a demurrer, as an allegation of agency is one of ultimate fact.. Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 235, 192 Cal. Rptr. 492. Here, Allen alleges that the conduct of defendant’s employees was carried out by a managing agent, or by an officer or director of defendants. He also alleges that A managing agent, officer, or director of defendant authorized and ratified each defendant’s conduct. Therefore, the court should overrule Defendant’s demurrer with respect to Allen’s cause of action for violation of the EADACPA.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this automobile accident/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS UNQUESTIONABLY THE CONTROLLING LAW IN CALIFORNIA

The collateral source doctrine has been the rule in California since at least 1925. Clark v. Burns Hamman Baths (1925) 71 Cal.App. 571, 575. The doctrine “expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other eventualities.” Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 10. The California Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the rule: if the tortfeasor were allowed to mitigate damages with payments from plaintiff’s insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his payment of premiums would have earned no benefit. The defendant should not be able to avoid payment of full compensation for the injury inflicted merely because the victim has had the foresight to provide himself with insurance. Id. at 10.

The Court elaborated on the related rule prohibiting the introduction of collateral source evidence, citing to Hrnjak, supra, 4 Cal.3d 725. In Hrnjak, the trial court allowed the defendant in a personal injury action to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had received insurance benefits, asserting the evidence was relevant to the plaintiff’s motives in seeking medical help and his credibility as a witness. Id. at p. 728. The Supreme Court held that this ruling was an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code § 352 because [e]ven with cautionary instructions, there is substantial danger that the jurors will take the evidence into account in assessing the damages to be awarded to an injured plaintiff.

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