Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

Sacramento Strip Club Sued, Part 1 of 7

June 15, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

First Amended Complaint for Damages for Sexual Harassment

THE PARTIES

1. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 1 ( PLAINTIFF DOE 1 ) was at all relevant times herein an individual female residing in the County of Sacramento.

2. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 2 ( PLAINTIFF DOE 2 ) was at all relevant times herein an individual female residing in the County of Sacramento.

3. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 3 ( PLAINTIFF DOE 3 ) was at all relevant times herein an individual female residing in the County of Sacramento.

4. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANT STARS, INC. ( DEFENDANT STARS ) was at all relevant times herein a corporation licensed to do business and conducting business in the State of California, and which owns an establishment known as Stars, Sacramento Club, which is a restaurant and gentleman’s club, i.e. a strip club located in Sacramento, California.

5. In the alternative, PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANT STARS, INC., dba SAM, INC. ( DEFENDANT STARS ) was at all relevant times herein a corporation licensed to do business and conducting business in the State of California, and which owns an establishment known as Stars, Sacramento Club, which is a restaurant and gentleman’s club, i.e. a strip club located in Sacramento, California.

6. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANT DAVID SMITH is an owner, officer, director and/or manager of Stars, Sacramento Club.

Roseville Employee Files Wrongful Termination Action, Part 2 of 8

June 15, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE SECTION 6310 (AND HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1278.5)

Foundation has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims, including the major claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. For settlement purposes, it is important to recognize that Foundation cannot win summary judgment or summary adjudication on this claim because of the existence of disputed issues of material fact, as well as Foundation’s incorrect interpretation of the law.

The pretextual reason given for Ms. Smith’s termination was her printing of a memorandum, addressed to her and publicly viewable on her supervisor’s computer screen, regarding discipline that her supervisor, Scott Dawson, apparently intended to impose in retaliation for her frequent complaints about the incompetence of Foundation management and Foundation’s many continuing safety and OSHA violations. At Ms. Smith’s termination hearing Mr. White also falsely claimed that Ms. Smith had accessed his Lotus Notes account and printed other documents from his work computer.

Ms. Smith’s termination letter referred to the following reasons for her termination: Violation of the Principle of Responsibilities, breach of confidentiality, invasion of privacy and violation of FG computer assets. (These should have been the reasons for Mr. White’s termination.) Ms. Smith printed the draft disciplinary memorandum and brought it to COO Oliver Browne because of Ms. Smith’s concern that Sam White had left it visible on his screen in an open cubicle for everyone to see, thereby violating her privacy rights as an employee. The act of leaving the draft disciplinary memorandum visible for everyone to see violated Foundation’s Principles of Responsibility, breached Ms. Smith’s right to confidentiality of her personnel records, violated her right to privacy, and was a violation of Foundation’s Electronic Assets Usage policy. Instead of properly discharging Sam White for his multiple violations of policy, Foundation, in violation of its own anti-retaliation policy, retaliated against Ms. Smith for complaining about Mr. White’s egregious violation of her confidentiality and privacy and terminated Ms. Smith instead.

Verdict Against Sacramento Physician For Malpractice, Part 4 of 4

June 14, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Question: Are medical malpractice plaintiffs eligible to recover prejudgment interest on their jury award when their statutory offer to settle has been rejected?

F. Plaintiff Received a More Favorable Verdict as Compared to the 998 Offer:
Whether the § 998 offerer obtained a more favorable judgment is ascertained by a simple comparison between the dollar amount of the offer and the dollar amount of the total judgment. Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 662, fn. 13]

Plaintiff is entitled to 10% interest on the judgment, calculated from the date of his or her first § 998 offer that was exceeded by the judgment. Such interest continues to accrue until the judgment is satisfied. Civil Code § 3291; see Steinfeld v. Foote-Goldman Proctologic Med. Group, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1550-1551, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 375 [interest accrues during pendency of appeal].

Here, the net dollar of the judgment against Dr. Kenneth B. is $3,723,000, which is to be compared with the Section 998 offer of $400,000 to determine if there was a more favorable verdict. Even if the judgment is reduced to the MICRA cap of $250,000, that amount plus the economic damages of $188,800 totals $448,800, still exceeds the section 998 offer of $400,000.

Moreover, when a defendant rejects plaintiff’s §998 offer – pre and post offer costs are added to the verdict to determine if there was a more favorable verdict. In this case there are over $50,000 in costs.

Roseville Family Suffers With Brain Damaged Newborn, Part 6 of 11

June 14, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

After her second call to the main OR, charge Nurse E. went to the main OR herself to see what could be done to expedite the delivery for Ms. Cruz, who was still upstairs in L&D. Nurse E. reported again to Dr. U. and to the main OR nurse the emergency circumstances involving Ms. Cruz. No one volunteered any information as to how best to resolve the situation. There was no discussion about the use of other OBs, or about informing the OR crew that was on the unit, though still in surgery in OR #1.

At 10:10 am,, anesthesia began on the breech patient. At 10:15 am, the FHR baseline on Ms. Cruz dropped to 100 bpm. At 10:20 am, L&D nursing documented absent variability with bradycardia.” The L&D nursing staff communicated this information to Dr. U. while he was operating on the breech patient. In turn, Dr. U. testified that he called for a crash Cesarean section on Ms. Cruz but he gave no further instructions as to how this order would be carried out. After 10:20, Dr. U. testified that he was not further advised of Ms. Cruz’ status.

At 10:25 am, Drs. Z. and C. completed the scheduled abdominal hysterectomy in OR #1. The surgery had begun before Ms. Cruz had even arrived at the hospital. Based on their deposition testimony, neither could recall anyone having advised them during that surgery that an emergency was unfolding either with the breech patient or with Ms. Cruz. Even after the procedure was completed, neither could recall anyone having advised them to stay or to assist with either patient and Dr. U. testified that no one advised him that other OB/GYNs were in the main OR area during this time.

The anesthesia stop time for the hysterectomy patient was 10:30 am. At that approximate time, Dr. X. has testified and provided a declaration under penalty of perjury, that he was the primary anesthesiologist in the OR that morning and that he was to stay in the hospital, but claimed to have been given no further instructions. Ms. Cruz remained upstairs in the L&D unit. Dr. .X. was in fact available at 10:30 a.m. to start anesthesia for Ms .Cruz. Shortly thereafter, pediatrician Dr. W. arrived and waited with Dr. X. for further instructions. At 10:32 am however, nursing notes on the fetal monitoring tracing of Ms. Cruz documented that Dr. X. was at her bedside in L&D.

Sacramento-area Hospital Sued For Birth Injury, Part 3 of 3

June 13, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO A CHILD, SPECIAL DAMAGES INCLUDE THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HOME ATTENDANT CARE PROVIDED BY THE CHILD’S PARENTS

The defense cannot bring up the quality of the care given to the minor by the parents in order to reduce the damages. The parents are entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable value of attendant care provided directly from the brain damaged child under the minor Plaintiff’s cause of action for economic damages. In an action to recover for personal injuries to a child, special damages include the reasonable value of home attendant care provided by the child’s parents.

In the case of Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 635, the Court of Appeal held that, “It is established that the reasonable value of nursing services required by the defendant’s tortious conduct may be recovered from the defendant even though the services were rendered by members of the injured person’s family and without an agreement or expectation of payment. Where services in the way of attendance and nursing were rendered by a member of the Plaintiff’s family, the amount for which the defendant is liable is the amount for which reasonably competent nursing and attendance by others could have been obtained.” (Id. at 644.)

In the case of Rodriguez v. McDonald Douglas Corporation (1978) 87 Cal. App.3d 626, the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the reasonable value of 24-hour home attendant care provided by his spouse and necessitated by the defendant’s tortious conduct. The Court held that,

“We reject the premise that the cost of attendant care, past or future, should not have been an item for consideration by the jury because of the presence of (the Plaintiff’s wife). It is not part of her duties as a wife to render 24-hour-a-day attendant care.” (Id. at p. 661.)

Thus, in this case, any attendant care provided by the parents in the past or which could be provided in the future must be compensated for at the reasonable rate which would be charged by a competent nursing attendant. Based upon evidence and testimony of various witnesses, the jury can properly determine the cost of such attendant care, regardless of who would provide it.

Huge Jury Award Due To Negligence By Sacramento Doctor, Part 3 of 4

June 12, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Question: Are medical malpractice plaintiffs eligible to recover prejudgment interest on their jury award when their statutory offer to settle has been rejected?

In this case, not only would the judgment for non-economic damages be reduced from $3.8 million dollars, which in and of itself, is a denial of the right to trial by jury and a nullification of their verdict, as guaranteed both by the by the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the California Constitution.

This unequal treatment is apparent when compared with the non-economic damages allowed by the AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund (Health and Safety Code Section 121270). Should someone be injured as a result of volunteering to take and AIDS vaccine the statute provides there is a limitation on damages:

Damages for personal injuries, means the direct medical costs for the care and treatment of injuries to any person, including a person entitled to recover damages under Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, proximately caused by an AIDS vaccine, the loss of earnings caused by the injuries, and the amount necessary, but not to exceed five hundred fifty thousand dollars ($550,000), to compensate for noneconomic losses, including pain and suffering caused by the injuries.

MICRA was enacted in 1975 by the California Legislature with a limitation of $250,000. The AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Act was enacted by the same California legislature in 1987, just twelve years later, but providing for more than a 100% increase in the amount allowed for non-economic damages: $250,000 versus $550,000.

Hispanic Workers Humiliated By Sexually Offensive Treatment By Sacramento-area Company, Part 18 of 18

June 12, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS BASED UPON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
104. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 87 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
105. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer severe emotional distress, humiliation, loss of sleep and mental anguish all to her damage.
106. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth above, was intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. Defendants’ conduct was done with knowledge that Plaintiffs’ emotional and physical distress would result and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiffs and was despicable, intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and severe emotional distress. Defendants’ conduct was done with the knowledge that Plaintiffs’ emotional and physical distress would as a result increase and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and the consequences to Plaintiffs. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary and/or punitive damages according to proof.
107. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary damages according to proof.

Botched Emergency C-Section Causes Catastrophic Birth Injury At Sacramento-area Facility, Part 5 of 11

June 12, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

According to the deposition testimony of nurses E. and F., the breech patient arrived after Ms. Cruz in L&D. Nurse E. did a physical examination and found the patient to be a term footling breech with bulging membranes and completely dilated. She considered her to be in need of an emergency Cesarean section, due to the threat of cord prolapse if her membranes ruptured spontaneously. She assigned the breech patient to L&D nurse, Nancy G.. At approximately 9:30 am, nurse G. called Dr. D. to advise him of his need to come in for his patient due to the breech emergency. Dr. D. informed nurse G. that he was out of town, two hours away, and asked whether there was another physician in-house who could deliver his patient. Nurse G. told him that Dr. U. was either coming in or already was in. She did not mention that he had an emergency patient of his own. There was no further contact with Dr. D.. According to charge nurse E., Dr. U. was made aware of the breech patient upon his arrival and that he agreed to deliver that patient. At 9:30 am, house supervisor Nurse F. called the members of the second-call OR crew as requested by Dr. U., and within 5 minutes, all team members had been contacted. Nurse F. then called L&D to confirm that the crew was on their way in. Sometime between 9:30 am and 10:00 am, the breech patient was taken down to the main OR on the orders of Dr. U., though the OR crew, called by Nurse F., had actually been initially requested for Ms. Cruz.

At 9:30 am, the systolic pressure on Ms. Cruz reached 150. Magnesium sulfate was started at 9:42 am. At 9:46 am, the FHR dipped to 110 beats per minute (bpm). At approximately 10:00 am, Dr. U. went to the basement to see about the status of the OR crew. At that time, Ms. Cruz’s systolic pressure rose to 164. There were no orders for anti-hypertensive medications. There is no documentation in the patient’s chart to indicate that Dr. U. was told about the rising systolic pressures.

Workplace Discrimination At Sacramento-area Hospital, Part 1 of 8

June 12, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Plaintiff’s Mandatory Settlement Conference Statement

Plaintiff Elaine Smith, a Workplace Safety Specialist employed at Foundation Hospital in Roseville was wrongfully terminated on January 10, 2006, in violation of public policy and Foudation’s own policies. Prior to her termination, Ms. Smith was treated in an abusive and discriminatory manner by her quasi-manager, Ethan Jones, and was underpaid compared to her male counterpart at another hospital within Foundation’s North Side group. At the time of her termination, Foundation failed to return personal property to her and, despite further requests, continued to keep her personal property. To compound its injuries to Ms. Smith, her former supervisor has made false statements which wrongfully prevented Ms. Smith from obtaining subsequent employment.

It is Plaintiff’s position that, for statutory and regulatory reasons, Foundation is obligated to follow its policies in terminating individuals who have otherwise made complaints about Foundation’s misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance. In Ms. Smith’s case, Foundation failed to properly follow its own policies…miserably. Not only did Foundation terminate the wrong person involved in the incident described below, but, in terminating Ms. Smith, Foundation failed to:

1) Provide any rule, guideline or policy which would indicate that the act was an offense subject to discipline or termination.
2) Provide any oral warning prior to termination.
3) Provide any written warning prior to termination.
4) Determine the actual severity of the alleged violation, determine any harm to the affected employee, or determine if there was any personal gain sought by Ms. Smith.

El Dorado Hills Woman Injured By Sacramento Bus, Part 6 of 7

June 11, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

In 2006, Diane Cash continued to treat with Drs. S. and C., and continued counseling with Dr. Y., for her continuing injuries sustained in the bus accident. In Interrogatory Responses of January 19, 2006, Diane Cash described her continuing symptoms as follows:

Response to Interrogatory 6.4:

Plaintiff continues to have the following: loss of balance, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, impaired speech, disorientation, blurred vision, to be emotionally labile, memory loss, decreased mentation, passivity, difficulty making decisions, loss of confidence, depression, difficulty walking, preclusion from driving. Plaintiff also continues to have pain and/or discomfort at the top of his head, forehead and behind her eyes, and in her back, right foot, and right shoulder (including an area underneath the clavicle).

Diane Cash remained disabled by her injuries in 2006. She continued to take medication prescribed by Dr. S., for vertigo, nausea, depression and pain. She was referred for speech therapy in 2005, continuing into 2006. Ms. Cash used a cane and/or a walker to ambulate, and received some home health care from Professional Health Care providers.

On October 24, 2006, neurologist Dr. S., plaintiff’s primary treating physician for her injuries, described his continuing treatment of Diane Cash as follows: “Ms. Cash was referred to me for monitoring of treatment of brain damage sustained in a bus accident where her head hit the ground. Ms. Cash’s symptoms of physical brain damage include headache, vertigo, nausea, vomiting, loss of balance, blurred vision, memory loss, decreased mental ability and comprehension, and impaired speech. I have treated Diane Cash for these symptoms for the last one-and-a-half years. Ms. Cash’s symptoms are within the acknowledged range of symptoms caused by brain damage.