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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position post-verdict. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident/bus accident case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff’s own medical expert, Dr. Levine, testified that the basis for his opinion (of injury) was only as good as the facts upon which they were based, i.e. the history and reports provided by plaintiff. As indicated above, plaintiff’s reporting was replete with distortions and omissions, including but not limited to her failure to reveal to Dr. Levine a subsequent trip and fall for which she sought treatment with a chiropractor for four months. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Finally, plaintiff walked with a prominent limp in front of the jury at all times during the six-day trial. She testified that her limp was always present, both in and out of the courtroom. She was then directly impeached with videotape, shown to the jury, depicting her walking freely and uninhibited, without a cane, just days before the trial commenced. Even without all the additional evidence as discussed above, the video evidence alone was a sufficient basis on which to conclude that plaintiff was not credible and was not truthful in claiming injury in this case.

After hearing all evidence discussed above, the jury held that plaintiff had sustained no injury as a result of the negligence of defendants. California law requires that, in order to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, there must be “no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict” rendered by the jury.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this slip and fall case could just as easily occur at any of the supermarkets in the area, such as Safeway, Raley’s, Bel Air, SaveMart, Walmart, or Whole Foods.

Even if the loss of the videotape was only negligent, CACI 203 (Party Having Power to Produce Better Evidence) instructs that the jury may draw an adverse inference against XYZ Market: You may consider the ability of each party to provide evidence. If a party provided weaker evidence when it could have provided stronger evidence, you may distrust the weaker evidence. This is based on Evidence Code section 412, which, provides: If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

There is videotape capability in the area where Ms. Black fell. XYZ Market insists that there is not and has never been any video taken on the incident date showing the area of Ms. Black’s fall. In direct contradiction, Charles Black has testified under oath that he was told by both Tom Miller and Kim Li of XYZ Market’s Risk Management Department that videotape of the slip and fall scene did in fact exist, and that XYZ Market was reviewing the tape in order to investigate Maggie Black’s accident. This presents an issue of fact whether XYZ Market did either lose or destroy the videotape. If it did, then the jury may draw an adverse inference that the videotape would have shown conditions detrimental to XYZ Market’s defense.

This Court should therefore deny the present motion on the additional triable issue of material fact concerning spoliation of evidence.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this automobile accident case could just as easily involve any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

The First Amended Complaint does not contain mere allegations that the defendant’s actions were carried on with willful and conscious disregard of the rights of others. In this regard, Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 and Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163 are inapposite to the present case. Unlike Brousseau and Grieves, Plaintiff did not merely allege that defendant’s actions were “willful” or “malicious.” Plaintiff refrained from making the sort of conclusory arguments that were scorned in Brousseau and Grieves, the claims for punitive damages in Brousseau and Grieves were not based on specific facts. In this case, plaintiff pled approximately 4 pages of detailed facts specifically alleging Dr. Black acted without regard for the safety of others in her operation of a vehicle while sleeping. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

As alleged throughout the First Amended Complaint, Dr. Black was incompetent and unfit to safely operate a vehicle because she was fatigued. From her residency training, she knew that she was a foreseeable threat to the health and safety of the public if she drove in a fatigued or sleepy condition. She deliberately was disregarding the high probability that she would fall asleep behind the wheel and cause permanent harm to another person. Despite her acute knowledge of the high risk of injuring someone with the vehicle, Dr. Black consciously chose to drive home while in a fatigued, sleep-deprived and exhausted condition. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It is also worth noting that situations similar to those described in this medical malpractice case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

Another way of putting the defense’s self consumption reduction would be to state the defense was asking a jury to speculate about an injured plaintiff’s prospective personal living expenses during the lost years period. (Id.) This the Court of Appeals refused to do. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

And the Court of Appeal had a second reason to reject the “self consumption” reduction: Second, and equally troubling, [Defendant] does not identify any case which applies a personal consumption or living expense deduction in this context. (Id. at p. 176.) In other words, the defense has no case authority. The defense argued such a deduction is made in wrongful death cases. But again, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument. The Court acknowledged that in wrongful death actions, an acceptable way to show how much money would have been available for the support of a decedent’s wife and children is to show how much money would have been earned during the remainder of his life, and to deduct from that amount his personal maintenance expense and the amount he would have spent on other things. (Id. at p. 176.)

However – – By contrast, in a personal injury action where lost years damages are recoverable, the measure of damages is not lost support but rather lost earnings during the period the plaintiff would have lived if not for the injury. (Fein. supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 153. Speculating as to how the injured party may have spend those future earnings if not for defendant’s tortuous conduct is a very different exercise than permitting a wrongful death plaintiff to prove damages for lost support by accounting for his or her supporter’s other expenses. (Overly, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.)

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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position post-verdict. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident/bus accident case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff still claims, in current moving papers, that her bus was “rammed” by defendant’s vehicle. In sharp contrast, the jury was shown photographs, copies of which are attached, which clearly reflect that defendant’s vehicle merely scraped along the left front cover of the bus. Further evidence established that no hidden or structural damage occurred to the bus. Damage to defendant’s van was minor, estimated at approximately $100. Common sense and inferences drawn from such evidence allowed the jury to conclude that no injury would result from the impact.

Defendant called Dr. Edward Stein, a physicist, to reinforce the unlikelihood of injury. Dr. Stein convincingly and completely refuted plaintiff’s claim of injury. He testified as to the force of the collision, and explained to the jury that plaintiff would have experienced a vibration in her seat inside the 40-foot bus due to contact from defendant’s vehicle. Similarly, Officer Brown testified that plaintiff may have been jostled by the contact between vehicles, but that he did not believe that plaintiff could have been injured.

Medical evidence established that plaintiff originally complained of minor contusion type injuries immediately following the accident. By the time of trial, plaintiff’s claims had expanded to include significant problems in her neck, low back, left hip, left buttocks, left thigh, left shin, left foot, left shoulder, headaches, and post traumatic stress disorder. Medical records prepared by plaintiff’s own providers note that plaintiff was an unreliable reporter, and prone to misrepresentation, exaggeration, and inconsistent reporting of symptoms. Plaintiff’s gross overreaching was made clear in evidence to the jury and undoubtedly contributed to erosion of plaintiff’s credibility.

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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is also worth noting that situations similar to those described in this birth injury case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

When responses were not forthcoming, by letter dated May 22, 2002, counsel for these responding defendants requested that plaintiffs’ counsel provide responses to the outstanding discovery responses by May 29, 2002. In said letter, counsel for responding defendants further indicated that given plaintiffs’ pending motion for trial preference, it was imperative that these severely outstanding responses be provided posthaste. While plaintiffs’ counsel again requested, and was granted, another extension of time, until June 1, 2002, to provide responses, no responses were forthcoming. As such, it is disingenuous for plaintiffs to request trial preference in a highly complex action involving extensive damages when they have impaired defendants’ ability to conduct even basic discovery necessary to evaluate this action and to prepare for trial. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this automobile accident case could just as easily involve any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

Since plaintiff’s allegations are based on facts, not mere speculation, the present case is consistent with the decisions cited in defendant’s moving papers, i.e., College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704 [plaintiffs failed to plead facts regarding defendants’ intent to injure or facts of vile or despicable conduct]; Colonial Life &Acc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 792 [a defendant may be liable for punitive damages if it acts with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s fights]; Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188 [summary adjudication of plaintiff’s punitive damages claim was proper since plaintiff’s evidence failed to show defendant acted despicably]; Hilliard v. AM. Robbins (1983.) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391 [plaintiff improperly alleged a separate cause of action for punitive damages instead of pleading the. statutory language in the negligence and strict liability causes of action]; Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [plaintiff did not plead any facts relative to malice]; Roth v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 676; and Fickv. Nilson (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 683.

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant knowingly and willfully decided to drive home after working excessive hours on the night of the incident, in spite of residency training that stated operating a vehicle under those conditions was likely to result in physical harm. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this slip and fall case could just as easily occur at any of the supermarkets in the area, such as Safeway, Raley’s, Bel Air, SaveMart, Walmart, or Whole Foods.

Spoliation of Evidence/Adverse Inference

The California Supreme Court, in finding that there is not an independent tort of spoliation of evidence, stated, The intentional destruction of evidence is a grave affront to the cause of justice and deserves our unqualified condemnation. There are, however, existing and effective nontort remedies for this problem. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 4. The Supreme Court found that the adverse inference a jury may draw against the spoliating party is an adequate safeguard: [In] Evidence Code section 413, this inference is as follows:

In determining what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case against a party, the trier of fact may consider, among other things, the party’s … willful suppression of evidence relating thereto … The standard California jury instructions include an instruction on this inference as well: If you find that a party willfully suppressed evidence in order to prevent its being presented in this trial, you may consider that fact in determining what inferences to draw from the evidence. (BAJI No. 2.03 (8th ed. 1994).) Id. At 12. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

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The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this medical malpractice case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, Regional Medical Center, Good Samaritan Hospital, Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, or O’Connor Hospital. For more information you are welcome to contact San Jose personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE ALL OF THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST DR. LEE BECAUSE THE FEBRUARY 27, 2005, PHYSICIAN-PATIENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENT GOVERNS ALL OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST DR. LEE.

A physician-patient arbitration agreement in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1295 binds the signatory patient, as well as certain non-signatories. In Bolanos v. Khalatian, (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1586, the Court of Appeal ruled on the issue of whether an arbitration agreement applies to disputes by non-signatories. The facts in the Bolanos case are similar to those in the present case. Bolanos was a medical malpractice action brought against an obstetrician. (Id. at 1588.) The patient signed a physician-patient arbitration agreement, which was written in Spanish, because the patient did not read English. (Id. at 1589.) The defendant obstetrician moved to compel arbitration, and the plaintiffs challenged the submission of the matter to arbitration, in part, because the patient’s husband did not sign the physician-patient arbitration agreement. (Id. at 1591.)

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(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this automobile accident case could just as easily involve any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, U.C. Davis Medical Center, Mercy, or Sutter.

PLAINTIFF HAS PLED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO ESTABLISH THAT DR. BLACK’S CONDUCT WAS DESPICABLE AND WITH A WILLFUL AND CONSCIOUS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Dr. Black pursuant to Civil Code Section 3294, which states in pertinent part:

(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(c)(1) Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(c)(2) Oppression means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

As established above, under California’s notice pleading requirement, plaintiff only has to plead ultimate facts sufficient to apprise defendant of the basis upon which plaintiff is seeking relief. Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Dr. Black’s actions fit within the meaning of C.C. § 3294. In unambiguous language, plaintiff has described Dr. Black’s actions in paragraphs 14, 15, 29-32, 37-39 and 42 of the First Amended Complaint that amount to malice and oppression, i.e., despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

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