Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

Gentlemen’s Club In Sacramento Sued For Sexual Harassment, Part 4 of 7

June 21, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

25. At all times during the employment relationship, PLAINTIFFS performed their duties in a highly satisfactory, competent and diligent manner.

26. PLAINTIFFS have filed Charges of Discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing ( DFE ), copies of which are incorporated herein by reference. Within one year of filing this complaint, the DFEH has issued a Right to Sue Notices authorizing this lawsuit, copies of which are incorporated herein by reference. PLAINTIFFS have exhausted their administrative remedies.

27. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful, knowing and intentional discrimination against them, PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer pain and suffering, and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress; PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of earnings and other employment benefits and job opportunities. PLAINTIFFS are thereby entitled to general and compensatory damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

28. As a further, direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of California Government Code section 12900 et seq., PLAINTIFFS have been compelled to retain the services of counsel in an effort to enforce the terms and conditions of their employment relationship with Defendants, and have thereby incurred and will continue to incur legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently unknown to them. PLAINTIFFS therefore request that attorneys’ fees be awarded pursuant to California Government Code section 12965.

Female Employee Sues Roseville Hospital For Wrongful Termination, Part 4 of 8

June 20, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

In fact, both the reasons given for Ms. Smith’s ultimate termination and the underlying reasons for the draft disciplinary letter which she printed from Mr. White’s screen were pretext for retaliatory action and restraint of Ms. Smith’s efforts to hold the managers in charge of Environmental, Health and Safety accountable for the numerous lapses in employee and patient safety which they have countenanced while she has worked for Foundation (first as a consultant, then as an employee).

Foundation managers expressed concerns about Ms. Smith’s communication style when she would communicate that a) there were serious defects in Foundation’s workplace safety program, and b) those managers were partly or fully responsible for those serious defects. Hospital workplace safety is governed by state and federal OSHA regulations, as well as other state and federal health regulations, and retaliation against an employee who voices concerns about violations of those regulations is a tortious violation of public policy as well as a violation of Labor Code Sec. 6310:

(a) No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has done any of the following:

(1) Made any oral or written complaint to the division, other governmental agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his or her representative.

In addition, Ms. Smith’s termination was in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5:
(b)(1) No health facility shall discriminate or retaliate, in any manner, against any patient, employee, member of the medical staff, or any other health care worker of the health facility because that person has done either of the following:
(a) Presented a grievance, complaint, or report to the facility, to an entity or agency responsible for accrediting or evaluating the facility, or the medical staff of the facility, or to any other governmental entity.

Family Sues Sacramento Physicians For Medical Malpractice, Part 2 of 6

June 19, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

1. The depositions of Plaintiffs JAMES PATEL and MARI SINDHURI support their claim for bystander emotional distress under Thing, in this medical malpractice action. Here, the decedent’s husband and sister have properly testified to contemporaneous observation of the continuing failure of the Defendants to properly treat Sundari and her excessive bleeding. Plaintiffs properly allege the elements of Thing v. LaChusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644: (1) they were closely related to the injured patient; (2) they were present at the scene of the continuing series of injury producing events at the time of these multiple events – the Defendants’ failure to properly treat the decedent, and (3) Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress.

2. The Plaintiffs witnessed an ongoing injury producing event – the excessive bleeding of Sundari Patel that killed her. Plaintiffs viewed a continuing injury because the Defendants’ failure to adequately treat the decedent. The decedent’s husband sister contemporaneously observed the continuing injury – the excessive bleeding – which continued for hours. Contrary to the moving papers, the husband and sister need not be aware of the medical processes to witness the incident, the failure to treat; nor do the Plaintiffs have to be aware of medical negligence (Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159[FN1] ; Ortiz v. HPM Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 178). Further, the motion argues the rejected exact moment argument – that the Plaintiff must observe the exact moment of injury.

Here, the defense argues that the Plaintiffs’ must view a specific act of negligence. The argument is not valid; because it assumes a singular event. This argument fails to account for a continuing injury for hours where the decedent did not receive adequate medical care. The Defendants cite Jansen v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 22; however, the Supreme Court in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 30 Cal.3d 159, 168, disapproved the portion of Jansen which required a sudden, brief occurrence viewed contemporaneously by the plaintiff. Here the Plaintiffs observed a series of events of an ongoing continuing injury. The Plaintiffs properly allege bystander emotional distress.

Roseville Child Born With Catastrophic Brain Injury, Part 8 of 11

June 19, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

LIABILITY:

Regional Medical Center: Hospital nursing personnel fell below the standard of care in the following areas:

1) Regardless whether Ms. Cruz or the breech patient arrived at the hospital first, once the second of the two arrived, hospital nursing personnel had a duty to obtain a third OR crew, which would, at a minimum, have necessitated phone calls to obtain a third anesthesiologist STAT. Assuming that the second OR crew was called for Ms. Cruz, as was suggested by the timing of Dr. U.’s call to house supervisor Nurse F., an OR crew had not been called for the breech patient which, under the circumstances was below the standard of care. The hospital made no provision for two simultaneous Cesarean deliveries under circumstances in which a scheduled surgery had also been planned. There were three operating rooms in the main OR, but the hospital only had 2 OR crews. No calls were ever made to obtain a third anesthesiologist, who was then available.

2) Failure to transfer Ms. Cruz directly to the main OR with fetal monitor and L&D nursing personnel at 9:20 am, and to monitor the patient at that location until surgery could begin, thereby avoiding the delay of delivery which occurred between 10:52 am and 11:15 am.

Further, at 9:34 am, the FHR baseline was noticeably smoother than it was at 9:10 am, which failed to get the attention of L&D nursing personnel or to form an additional basis on which to prompt immediate transfer to the main OR. There is nothing in the chart indicating that Dr. U. was ever made aware of these changes of the FHR.

Female Employees File Sexual Harassment Action Against Sacramento Strip Club, Part 3 of 7

June 19, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Sexual Harassment in Violation of Gov’t. Code §12900 et seq., by All PLAINTIFFS and Against All DEFENDANTS)

21. PLAINTIFFS repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 and incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein.

22. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, illegally discriminated against PLAINTIFFS by sexually harassing them during the course of their employment, in violation of the California Fair Employment & Housing Act, Gov’t. Code §12900 et seq. (hereinafter FEHA ), in that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, required PLAINTIFFS to wear sexually suggestive attire as a condition of employment; and/or it could be reasonably expected that if PLAINTIFFS wore the sexually suggestive attire, they would be subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment from customers or others; and/or that the requirement that PLAINTIFFS wear the sexually suggestive uniforms would essentially require them to become walking pornography in the workplace.

23. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, cannot articulate any legitimate, business-related reason or bona fide occupational qualification to excuse their conduct.

24. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that in addition to the practices enumerated above, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, may have engaged in other discriminatory practices against them which are not yet fully known. At such time as such discriminatory practices become known to them, PLAINTIFFS will seek leave of Court to amend this complaint in that regard.

Strip Club In Sacramento Harasses Female Workers, Part 2 of 7

June 17, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

10. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 1 commenced employment with DEFENDANT STARS in or about April 1998 as a waitress. At no time was PLAINTIFF DOE 1 employed as a stripper.

11. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 2 commenced employment with DEFENDANT STARS in or about April 1998 as a waitress. At no time was PLAINTIFF DOE 2 employed as a stripper.

12. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 3 commenced employment with DEFENDANT STARS in or about April 1998 as a waitress. At no time was PLAINTIFF DOE 3 employed as a stripper.

13. Upon the commencement of their employment, all PLAINTIFFS were instructed to wear a black skirt and white shirt of their choosing as proper work attire for waitresses. Thereupon, each PLAINTIFF selected an appropriate black skirt and white shirt to wear to work at Stars each day.

14. Shortly after the commencement of her employment with DEFENDANT STARS, PLAINTIFF DOE 1 was promoted from waitress to bartender. Thereafter, PLAINTIFF DOE 1 was promoted again, to assistant manager.

15. In or about September, 1998, Stars manager Bennie Brown informed PLAINTIFF DOE 1 that there would be no more women behind the bar, and that effective immediately, female employees would be eligible for positions only as waitresses or strippers. Thereupon PLAINTIFF DOE 1 was immediately demoted back to the position of waitress, where she earned less income and had less opportunity for advancement than in either the bartender or assistant manager position. After that time, all food servers at Stars, Sacramento Club were female, and all bartenders and management were male.

16. In or about September, 1998, all PLAINTIFFS were informed that they would no longer be permitted to wear to work the black skirt and white shirt of their choosing as they had previously worn. Instead, they would now be required to wear a very skimpy and demeaning uniform consisting of stretch hot pants that reveal substantial portions of the wearer’s naked buttocks and a tiny midriff stretch top which exposes all of the wearer’s stomach. PLAINTIFFS were informed that all waitresses would be required to wear this uniform from that point forward.

Sacramento-area Hospital Sued For Workplace Discrimination, Part 3 of 8

June 17, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Foundation has a very clear national policy regarding Corrective/Disciplinary Action because it is obligated to have one. Foundation Group (FG) must comply with specific legal/regulatory standards that include, but are not limited to, those indicated by Medicare and other government program billing requirements, Guidance issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Compliance Program Guidance issued by the Office of the Inspector General, and HIPAA/Privacy and Security regulations …. FG is required to have well publicized disciplinary guidelines that demonstrate its commitment to compliance and set forth the consequences for violations of compliance mandates. (See, Corrective/Disciplinary Action policy, page 1.)

In other words, state and federal laws and regulations require that Foundation follow its Corrective/Disciplinary Action policy. The last paragraph of that policy states: Employees who report compliance and/or ethics concerns in good faith will not be subject to corrective/disciplinary action for doing so… Nevertheless, even assuming the truth of Foundation’s purported reason for terminating Ms. Smith, Ms. Smith was terminated in violation of Foundationr’s legally mandated policy because she was terminated for printing out an improperly viewable document to show to Mr. Browne. (See Part 4 of 8.)

Wrongful Death At Sacramento-area Hospital, Part 1 of 6

June 16, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Adjudication By David X., M.D.
and Valley Physicians
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION

This is a medical malpractice and wrongful death action. Thirty-two year old Sundari Patel presented at herself to the defendants with abdominal pain which was later diagnosed as being from torsion of the left fallopian tube. She had excessive bleeding which was not timely addressed. The defendants should have arranged exploratory surgery to determine the source of the excessive bleeding. Because of the delay by the defendants, Sundari bled to death.

On March 1, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress which occurred prior to the death. The decedent’s husband, JAMES PATEL, and the decedent’s sister, MARI SINDHURI, witnessed Sundari’s excessive bleeding that cost Sundari’s life.

Now, DR. X. and VALLEY EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS have filed a motion for summary adjudication asserting that the plaintiffs could not have contemporaneous observation because the husband and sister could only view the symptoms. But to the contrary, the Supreme Court in Bird v. Saenz (2002) 28 Cal.4th 910, has held that an injury-producing event can be the failure to provide proper medical attention – and that observing the symptoms was sufficient for bystander emotional distress:

Surgical Confusion Leads To Malpractice At West Sacramento Hospital, Part 7 of 11

June 16, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Nursing notes picked up again in the OR. The first reference after 10:52 am was at 11:05, with Ms. Cruz in the OR. The anesthesia record of Dr. X. referred to fetal distress. Thus far, no one has testified to what occurred between 10:52 and 11:05 am. Dr. U. testified that he was present when Ms. Cruz arrived in the OR and that he left the breech patient to Dr. V. to sew up the initial skin incision. The surgery schedule indicated that the surgery stop time for the breech case was not until 11:15 am. The anesthesia record and Dr. X. testified that his spinal anesthesia began at 11:08 am. At 11:09 a.m., the fetal heart rate could not detected on Ms. Cruz’ baby. The spinal was said to have taken effect by 11:10 am – the time of the start of surgery for Ms. Cruz. At 11:10 am, a nursing progress note indicated that the spinal was completed and that the FHR (by hand-held doppler) on Martha was absent. In his operative report, Dr. U. reported that the surgery was rushed with a single shot of spinal analgesia, that there was massive intra-uterine bleeding” (estimated at 1800 cc), that a nuchal cord was present and 1200 cc of clots were found. Martha was delivered at 11:15 am.; she was born clinically dead with no signs of life. Dr. W. testified that he believed that the child probably had been dead for at least 8 minutes, from the time that nursing noted the absence of a heart rate at 11:10 am, until 3 minutes following the birth, when the first signs of life appeared. The placenta was sent to pathology and found to be normal.

Brain Damaged Woman Faces Long Recovery After Sacramento Bus Collision, Part 7 of 7

June 15, 2009 | by Moseley Collins

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Through the present, Diane Cash continues to treat with Dr. S. and Dr. C. and continues to receive counseling from Dr. Y., for her injuries sustained in the bus accident of February 6, 2005. Additionally, as prescribed and instructed by Dr. S., Ms. Cash receives cognitive, speech, physical and occupational therapy. Diane Cash remains disabled by her injuries through the present time.

Medical bills to date total in excess of $50,000.00.

Plaintiff’s counsel has retained the services of Life Care Planner, Carol H.. Plaintiff anticipates future expenses for medication and transportation or attendant care in excess of $20,000 per year.

C. Future Medical Expenses.

Diane Cash continues to receive cognitive retraining, physical therapy and speech therapy at St Luke’s Hospital. The monthly charges for this therapy are as follows:

Cognitive retraining $186.00
Physical therapy $186.00
Speech therapy $294.00
TOTAL: $666.00
Ongoing medical expenses, including medication, reduced to present cash value, are anticipated to be $507,000.00.